He positioned his army in front of his enemy when aggressiveness by the Southern commander could have endangered Grant’s numerically equal force. Grant realized that his place was in the field with the principal Union army in the East, the Army of the Potomac. Many have argued that Lee had no choice but to be recklessly aggressive because the South had no other way to win the war. But the frontal attack occurred only after Grant had stretched Bragg’s defenses on both flanks, thereby weakening the Confederate middle. Both were fraught with potential issues. Military Education. After Chattanooga, for example, he alone raised his hat in salute to a ragged band of Confederate prisoners through which Union generals and their staffs were passing, and at Hampton Roads late in the war, he spoke to a group of Rebel amputees about better artificial limbs that were being manufactured. Maneuvering his forces (using the telegraph as the primary communications means) quickly, Grant had his opponent in a vise, only to have then Brigadier General William Rosecrans’ lack of aggressiveness (and failure to advance in accordance with his own schedule) combine with unusual weather conditions to save his opponent.18 Grant proved that Union forces under his command would aggressively fight when presented openings. Get an answer for 'What was Ulysses S. Grant's strength?' Iuka and Cornith proved to Grant that conducting operations from afar was very difficult, especially with a strong-willed subordinate such as Rosecrans. General Ulysses S. Grant was decisive in the American Civil War through his Clausewitzian understanding of the conflicts character, his ability to operationalize President Abraham Lincolns policy into a matching military strategy of total war, and his relentless execution of its campaigns. Much as been written about the North’s successful strategy.2Many other books describe the tactical changes that occurred during the war,3 but few authors highlight the operational change introduced by Grant. That it did not be due as much, if not more, to its own failings as to the superior strength of the foe.”. He had to, because he had made a mistake and permitted subordinates, particularly Sherman, too much latitude. But Grant had placed his army in a position to capture the entire opposing force, and capture (most of) it he did. Ulysses S. Grant was the most acclaimed Union general during the American Civil War and was twice elected President. Others have argued that Lee’s aggressiveness was compelled by Southerners’ expectations that he take the offensive. By 1864, therefore, Grant had a 120,000-man army and additional reserves to bring against Lee’s 65,000 and, by the sheer weight of his numbers, imposed a fatal 47 percent casualty rate on Lee’s army while losing a militarily tolerable 43 percent of his own replaceable men, as he drove from the Rappahannock to the James River and created a terminal threat to Lee’s army and Richmond. A nation must expect its generals to be lucky, however; and both Grant and Lee were! See for example, Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, Volume 3 (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1945), 439. First, Grant understood that war could not be a seasonal activity. While Grant’s strategic vision was vitally important to victory, this paper concentrates on his operational, as opposed to tactical or strategic, innovation. Grant favored defensive tactics while Lee relied on relentless offensive to win battles. Generals acting the operational level of war, however, must rely on such occurrences. Neither general was a ‘butcher,’ but measured by that statistic, Lee deserved the label more than Grant.”. The Complete Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant: The Autobiography of a General and U.S. President - Both Volumes, with Illustrations and Maps (Hardcover) by Ulysses S Grant | Aug 28, 2018. The climax of the campaign would occur along Grant’s eight-mile-long front encircling the Confederate defenders. It's been noted that there isn't all that great a difference between strategy and tactics, and I still think Lee was ahead of Grant as far as the fighting of the immediate battle/situation. At the time the Union army took positions surrounding the fort, the Confederate commander had as many men as Grant – and the Confederates were probably better armed! It was Lee’s strategy and tactics that dissipated irreplaceable manpower—even in his “victories.” His army lost at Malvern Hill, Antietam, Gettysburg, the Shenandoah Valley, Petersburg, and Appomattox. Jacqueline E. Whitt. After the long and brutal war Grant went on to become president of the U.S., and Lee became president of a college. 12 If Grant did not believe in reading about military doctrine, his most trusted subordinate, Major General W.T. Hardcover $44.98 $ 44. In the West, General Ulysses S. Grant employed the wise strategy of: a. guerrilla war tactics. 11 U.S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 166-7. As Alan Nolan argued, because the South was so badly outnumbered and the burden was on the North to win the war, Lee’s grand strategy should have been a defensive one that did not squander the scarce manpower of the Confederacy. If Lee had performed differently, the North could have been fatally split on the war issue, Democratic nominee George B. McClellan might have defeated Lincoln, and the South could have negotiated an acceptable settlement with the compromising McClellan. Grant’s personal presence on the battlefield was undoubtedly critical to the Union success. Griffith, Paddy. Battle Tactics of the Civil War. In Fuller's The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant, he thinks that Grant was not an innovator in tactics;* his skill was more in the operational and strategic sphere. Finally, the losses Lee’s army suffered at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania were higher than he could afford and helped to create the aura of Confederate defeat that Lincoln exploited to win reelection. After spending nearly six months trying various schemes to place his men in a position to surround Vicksburg, Grant decided on a fast tempo campaign of maneuver. But for these experiences, it is problematic if Grant would have seen the necessity for being in the field with the army during the Vicksburg campaign, or more importantly, during the Army of the Potomac’s epic struggle against Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. Catton, 234-5, describes it best, citing a quote attributed to Meade in a letter to his wife, "…says, ‘The Army of the Potomac, directed by Grant, commanded by Meade, and led by Hancock, Sedgwick and Warren…’ which is quite a good distinction and about hits the nail on the head." He seized the initiative and set the tempo for the campaign, which resulted in the Confederate loss of Nashville, and with it the important industry and commerce that city provided the Southern cause. Confidence is a pre-requisite to a commander’s use of maneuver and increased tempo, and Grant acquired that essential early in the war. 13. Lee’s army’s 1862–3 casualties made possible Grant’s successful 1864 campaign of adhesion to Lee’s army. 98. It also had the interior lines and was able to move its troops from place to place over shorter distances via a complex of well-placed railroads. C. Grant preferred measured tactics like dividing his army while Lee tended to whip his troops into a frenzy. 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